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of the law, violations of which &dquo;have never
sent a single businessman to jail for a
single day.&dquo; However, &dquo;the biggest loop-
hole in the antitrust laws remains the re-
luctance of judges to apply the laws to
concrete cases on the kind of evidence
which such cases must necessarily present.&dquo;
This reluctance rests on two factors: first,
&dquo;a natural unwillingness by judges to be-
lieve that businessmen-their friends, as-
sociates, and former clients-have broken
the law, or, if they have, should be stig-
matized publicly&dquo;; second, &dquo;the ignorance
of judges about the economic facts of
life.&dquo;
Thus, the antitrust laws are not im-
potent ; they have been effective, and can
be more effective with more judicial sup-
port and expanded enforcement facilities.
The law of free enterprise, with all its de-
fects, is &dquo;a good practical framework for
the economic system&dquo; and will help us
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This book might be characterized as a
highly successful popularization of the
work of the late Lord Keynes and particu-
larly of his General Theory, were it not
for the fact that &dquo;popularization&dquo; carries
with it undesirable overtones of oversim-
plification. This would do Professor Dil-
lard an injustice. He presents in the first
two-thirds of his book the main ideas of
the General Theory, but he spells them
out in detail and integrates them in a way
which makes them accessible both to the
average undergraduate and to the inter-
ested layman. It is hardly necessary to
summarize the content of these chapters.
The remainder of the book is given over
to policy discussions and a highly sugges-
tive final chapter on &dquo;The Development of
Keynes’ Thought and the Social Philoso-
phy Towards Which It Leads.&dquo; A bibli-
ography of Keynes’s writings and exten-
sive references to the relevant Keynesian
literature at the end of various chapters
are useful parts of the book.
Professor Dillard writes not only as an
admirer of Keynes (only a dull person
could fail to be intrigued by the person-
ality and intellect of Keynes, regardless of
whether there is agreement or not) but as
a faithful apostle. Thus the book essen-
tially, though not wholly, avoids criticisms
as well as further developments of the
General Theory. In addition, the author
insists that Keynes was not interested in
theory as such, but in policy. Hence even
the theoretical chapters are written with
a view toward their application.
It. is, of course, an author’s privilege to
write the kind of book he wants. Because
of this emphasis on policy, the book is
probably easier to teach and to read than
if it were written from the standpoint,
say, of a critical appraisal of the Keynesian
system. Given his purpose, Professor Dil-
lard has done a superior job.
Yet it is the privilege of the reviewer to
wonder whether this emphasis on policy as
against theory is not really defeating the
aim of the book. To be sure, Professor
Dillard warns already in the Preface that
the Keynesian theory is one thing, and the
policy implications another. To be sure,
Keynes’s interest was practical. But his
theory was essentially a short-run theory,
a fact mentioned by the author only casu-
ally, and it was perhaps not quite as
general as Dillard claims. Consequently
Keynes could overemphasize in an almost
classical manner the importance of the
rate of interest in a manner which few of
the younger economists would share. And
his treatment of the influence of wages on
employment, justified perhaps at the time
of writing the General Theory, has cer-
tainly to be revised for our own use, as
was done, for example, by James Tobin’s
essay in The New Economics.
This brings up a second point of em-
phasis-Keynes’s break with the classical
tradition. Of course, Keynes was a here-
tic : every great original mind is. It
would, in this reviewer’s opinion, only in-
crease Keynes’s stature to point to such
other heretics as, say, Schumpeter. But by
stressing the policy aspects of Keynes’s
work and overemphasizing his break with
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the classical economists, the danger of a
new orthodoxy arises which is utterly for-
eign to Keynes’s open mind, and which he
himself characterized as modern stuff gone
silly and sour. Not that Professor Dillard
deserves Keynes’s posthumous strictures.
Yet I feel strongly that emphasis on
Keynes’s theory as theory rather than as a
rationalization of policy would have been
a greater service. Keynes had sufficient
practical instinct to neglect or change his
own theories as the changing situation de-
manded. Most of us lesser mortals must
depend somewhat more on a good theory.
From the author’s standpoint, the last
chapter, on the development of Keynes’s
thought, is a fitting climax. It is an im-
passioned exposition of the many and
varied writings of Keynes. It is true, as
Dillard repeatedly points out, that Keynes
was very much more often correct than
those he fought. Yet the &dquo;break&dquo; with
the classical orthodoxy seems to this re-
viewer less a logical break than a superior
ability of Keynes to adapt himself to rap-
idly changing situations.
For example, Keynes’s superior insight
led him to fight the restoration of the gold
standard at the old parity, and to predict
correctly the &dquo;Economic Consequences of
Mr. Churchill.&dquo; Yet as a member of the
Macmillan Committee he was against the
abandonment of the gold standard, once
the original mistake and the sacrifices to
correct it had been made. At the same
time, Keynes’s proposal to raise tariffs
must be understood, it seems to this re-
viewer, not mainly as unorthodox (al-
though Keynes’s appendix to the Macmil-
lan Report can be considered the first
formulation of the foreign-trade multi-
plier), but as an indirect way to reduce
real wages and thus to ea.se the pressure
on British industry and to increase em-
ployment. Labor fought it, not because
they were more orthodox than Keynes
(though they probably were), but precisely
because they understood that he was up
to lowering their real wages. Yet a short
time later Keynes ceased to favor protec-
tion once the abandonment of the gold
standard had made it meaningless and
harmful.
These remarks are offered not so much
as a criticism of a job well done, but as a
means of appreciating even more the im-
portance of Lord Keynes’s work, which is
independent of its short-run or long-run
policy implications, and which will shape
economic thought and practice for a long
time, even after the last of the original
pronouncements of the General Theory
will have been shown to be untenable.
W. F. STOLPER
University of Michigan
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The first of a series of volumes devoted
to the scientific study of the social, eco-
nomic, and administrative experience of
World War II, under the editorship of
W. K. Hancock, Fellow of All Souls Col-
lege, Oxford, the present book turns back
the clock to the days when the United
Kingdom stood alone as the defender of
the democratic tradition. After the British
Cabinet decided in 1942 to gather mate-
rials for a history of the- conflict, the co-
authors were given access to all official
documents. The artistry with which they
have collated facts and the clarity of their
exposition combine to make this civil his-
tory a living record of Britain’s struggle
to forge an invincible war economy.
Dividing their study into five broad pe-
riods of military significance-Perspective,
Period of Anglo-French Alliance, From
Dunkirk to Pearl Harbor, From Pearl
Harbor to Normandy, After Normandy-
the authors base their analysis upon the
belief that economic events should be
linked with strategic events, that a con-
trolled economy cannot be understood
without an over-all view of the controlling
institutions, and that it would be insular
and unrealistic to ignore the international
environment which so powerfully governs
a nation’s economic effort.
British War Economy is commended
especially for its critical viewpoint, its ex-
cellent documentation, and its effort to tell
the whole story with both dispassion and
completeness. Although its emphasis is on
the winning of the war, and not on the
